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      China and the Multilateral Trading System 
 
 
For more than two decades, China’s rapid growth has been driven by its global 
economic engagement.  Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, foreign trade and foreign 
direct investment have made even more important contributions to Chinese growth.  
Between 2001 and 2005, for example, the dollar value of Chinese exports and imports 
increased at annual rates of 29.3 and 25.3 percent respectively and in 2005, 58 percent of 
Chinese exports originated from foreign owned firm.   As a result of this performance, 
China’s share in world imports increased from 3.3 in 2001 to 5.9 percent in 2004 and its 
share in world exports from 3.9 percent in 2001 to 6.5 percent in 2004. This makes China 
a major participant in world trade and having now surpassed Japan, the dominant trading 
power in East Asia 
1 China looms particularly large as an exporter of labor- intensive 
manufactured goods and components and as a major importer of capital goods, primary 
commodities and semi-finished parts. 
2 It is also the developing world’s largest recipient 
of direct foreign investment. 
Given its size, the pace of its expansion, and its outward orientation, China is 
likely to have a growing impact on the global trading system and its policies are likely to 
have an important influence on the system’s evolution. These policies have been as 
dynamic as its trade and investment performance. In 2001 after fourteen years of 
negotiations, China became a full member of the WTO, assuming obligations that are at 
                                                 
1 In 2003 and 2004 china accounted for 10.6 and 8.9 of the growth in world imports and 10.5 and 9.7 of 
world exports. 
2 Having assumed the ranks of the world’s third largest trader, Chinese trade policies will now be subject to 
the WTO Trade review mechanism every two years – a treatment reserved for countries with large trade 
volumes. 
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the level of many developed economies. Since that time it has participated actively in the 
institution’s activities and negotiations. In part to meet the conditions of its accession, 
China has also dramatically liberalized its domestic economy and introduced a large 
number of internal policies that consolidate its transition to a market economy. In 
addition, China has adopted a multi-track trade policy strategy, complementing its WTO 
and domestic liberalization policies with regional trading initiatives. By 2005, China had 
completed four FTA agreements (Thailand in 2003, Hong Kong and Macao in 2004 and 
Chile in 2005) and as estimated by Wong and Hufbauer have proposed and/or launched 
negotiations for least another fifteen.
3   
What do these policies portend? When China proposed joining the WTO several 
concerns were raised. One was that the system as a whole could be weakened because 
China was not a fully market driven economy and was therefore unlikely or unable to 
adhere to the WTO rules. China then acceded to the WTO under very demanding terms 
and there were fears that either deliberately or inadvertently it would not implement these 
commitments.
4 This would put other members in the difficult position of either (a) trying 
to compel compliance with trade retaliation and other sanctions that could increase 
frictions or (b) ignoring Chinese infractions thereby undermining the WTO system in 
establishing an international rule of law to which all members adhered. 
A second concern was that China would not participate constructively in the 
WTO. It would throw its weight around, try quickly to obtain disproportionate influence 
                                                 
3 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Yee Wong, “Prospects for Regional Free Trade in Asia” Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Number WP-o5-12. October 2005. Their list of 
proposed agreements includes APEC, East Asia, South-East Asia, Brazil, GCC, India, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, South Africa,  Mercosur, Australia, Chile, Iceland, Japan, Korea and Pakistan. 
4 Glenda Mallon and John Whalley for example express concern about that Chinese policy instruments 
would generate many new trade disputes.  See “China’s Post Accession WTO Stance” NBER Working 
Paper No. 10649 August 2004.    5 
and use its influence to fundamentally change the WTO system. China was also seen as a 
potentially powerful addition to the ranks of developing countries, and many in the 
developed world worried that it would seek to limit the obligations required of 
developing countries.  
 More recently a third set of questions is being raised with respect to China’s trade 
policies in the East Asian region. Would Chinese regional initiatives undermine the 
multilateral trading order? Is China seeking to establish an East Asian trading bloc under 
its leadership that discriminates against outsiders? Will it use its market to create a hub 
and spoke system in East Asia in which China gains serves as the hub and the other 
countries are the spokes?  Finally there is the fear that not only China but other countries 
in the region are creating a system of overlapping trade regimes – or a noodle bowl – that 
could impose unnecessary trading costs, induce harmful trade diversion, and actually 
fragment rather than integrate the regional economy. 
 This paper, considers these questions.  Chinese policies are analyzed with a view 
to determining the direction they are taking and the effects they are likely to have on the 
multilateral system. The discussion first considers China’s participation in the WTO. It 
reviews the terms of accession, China’s current tariff and trade regime and its 
participation in the Doha Round negotiations and the institution’s regular activities.  The 
analysis concludes that China’s trade policies are broadly supportive of a rules based 
multilateral trading order. China has accepted and implemented obligations that go far 
further than most developing countries. It has been interested in using the system to 
advance its interests rather than in changing it.
5 Its behavior at the WTO is thus more 
                                                 
5 See Margaret M. Pearson, China’s Multiple Personalities in Geneva: Constructing a Template for Future 
research on Chinese Behavior in WTO” University of Maryland (mimeo) 2003.   6 
akin to that of a status quo power than one seeking major systemic changes. The 
discussion then turns to China’s FTA initiatives. These are still a work in progress, and 
their implications are uncertain.  Concerns about an East Asian fortress appear misplaced. 
Directly, and through their impact in inducing others to respond, these FTAs could 
provide a powerful impetus to the process of competitive global liberalization.  Countries 
that do implement agreements with China will find it relatively easy to open their markets 
to other developing countries. There is also a risk that the proliferation of  FTAs will lead 
to web of overlapping agreements that could make the trading system unnecessarily 
complex.    
 China’s policies both at home and abroad are still evolving and thus major shifts 
in the direction and nature of the policies cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, the final 
section considers four factors that could play an important role in influencing outcomes 
in the future. These are the precise terms of the agreements that are concluded, China’s 
domestic implementation of its commitments, the impact of currency appreciation on 
China’s competitiveness and protectionist responses to China by other countries.  
Section I: China in the WTO 
    The WTO operates by consensus. Any country seeking to join must 
essentially satisfy all existing members before they will permit it to accede. To be sure, 
formally, there is a requirement for decisions on accession to be approved by a vote of 
two thirds of the Members (Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art 
XII.1) and there are also provisions allowing existing and acceding members a one time 
opportunity to opt out from extending MFN provisions when countries accede 
(Agreement Establishing the WTO Art XIII) but in practice unanimity is sought and most   7 
countries receive full MFN treatment. The need to obtain such approval means that new 
members are often asked to assume obligation that are far more extensive than existing 
members at an equivalent stage of economic development. 
Accession Commitments.  The terms of China’s accession to the WTO exemplify 
these propositions. Although China is a developing country and thus in principle entitled 
by the WTO’s “enabling clause” to special and differential treatment, the United States 
and other WTO members were successful in insisting that China enter the WTO on 
“commercial terms”. This meant that China assumed obligations that in many cases went 
far beyond those expected of existing members at its stage of development. These 
commitments involved not simply reducing border barriers but undertaking detailed 
changes in internal policies. 
Upon accession China was required to make major tariff reductions and by 2007 
to reduce average import-weighted average tariffs to 6.8 percent. 
6This is a major 
additional decline in tariffs which had averaged 40.6 percent as recently as1992 and is 
almost half the average level in place upon accession. Almost all China’s non-tariff trade 
barriers have to be removed. Nearly all imports and export quotas and licenses had to be 
removed by 2005 and those that did remain to be administered in a transparent manner. 
By 2005, all firms were to be allowed to import and export goods. China also agreed to 
implement the WTO TRIMs agreement without exceptions and thus could no longer 
make the permission to invest or import contingent on performance requirements such as 
earning foreign exchange or using domestic content.  Restrictions on foreign participation 
in the distribution sector were to be phased out within three years. China also agreed to 
                                                 
6 Razeen Sally, “China’s Trade Policies and its Integration into the World Economy” Paper prepared for 
IGD/SAIIA SACU-China FTA Workshop, Johannesburg, 28-29
th September 2004.     8 
the TRIPs and it adopted the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements immediately upon its 
accession.  
  There were also a host of commitments with respect to policy transparency 
including obligations to translate into English and publish new laws and regulations and 
to establish inquiry points for foreign firms and governments. Time is be allowed for 
comment before laws are promulgated and new tribunals established to review 
administrative acts relating to WTO implementation with the right of appeal to higher 
judicial bodies. 
  Although the WTO is in principle based on non-discrimination China was also 
compelled to agree, on a transitory basis, to permit members to subject it to 
discriminatory treatment. First, it agreed to both a special selective safeguard that could 
be used against its exports for twelve years after its accession. It also agreed to an 
additional safeguard provision for textiles and apparel that would be in force until the end 
of 2008 and could be (and has been) used temporarily to deny it the full benefits of the 
expiration of the MFA in 2005; 
7Second, China agreed to accept non-market economy 
status for the purposes of anti-dumping rules until the end of 2015. This would allow 
countries to use specially constructed prices in evaluated claims of dumping brought 
against Chinese exporters; and third, China allowed the WTO setting up a transitional 
Review Mechanism that would review its implementation record annually for the first ten 
years of its membership.  
   These demanding terms were useful for Chinese reformers. Before its accession 
to the WTO, China’s initial domestic reforms involved taking tentative steps towards 
                                                 
7 Par 242 of the report of the Working Party on the Accession of China” 
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introducing a market system to its economy.  The enterprises that played a leading role in 
these reforms, however, were generally owned by foreign investors and local Chinese 
governments rather than private Chinese entrepreneurs.  WTO membership strengthened 
the hand of reformers seeking to hasten China’s movement towards a more developed 
market economy.  The benefits from WTO accession became an added reason for 
undertaking the domestic reforms needed to join the organization.  WTO entry has 
allowed China’s leadership to make a more credible commitment towards moving China 
towards a system that more fully recognizes private enterprise.  
The requirements of WTO entry forced Chinese policymakers to confront 
politically difficult issues.  These included reforming domestic banking institutions, 
subjecting state-owned enterprises to harder budget constraints, and allowing private 
firms to freely engage in international trade.  WTO entry also mobilized domestic firms 
to become more competitive through restructuring, acquiring new technologies, and 
forming new alliances and mergers with both domestic and foreign firms.  
 The WTO accession process also served to promote better Chinese governance.  
The WTO requires policy transparency and the enforcement of domestic trade policies on 
the basis of rules rather than bureaucratic discretion.  WTO membership also necessitates 
non-discrimination (i.e. national treatment) for imported goods and services.  China 
remains a country with considerable domestic barriers and strong provincial 
governments.  If provinces are forced to provide national treatment for imported goods 
and services, they will find it harder to discriminate against goods from other provinces. 
Many of these reforms are changes that China might have chosen to implement anyway, 
but entry into the WTO served to advance their implementation.   10 
    
  In 2004, as reported in Table 1 below, these requirements were apparent in 
China’s tariff regime and WTO commitments.  China had bound one hundred percent of 
its tariffs—a discipline which most other Asian and many developing countries and 
developed countries have not accepted. Unlike almost all developing countries that have 
average bound rates far in excess of their applied rates, there is almost no water in 
China’s tariffs. Its average applied rates in 2004 of 10.4 were converging closely to its 
final bound rate average of 10 percent. China’s average applied rates on non-agricultural 
products of 9.5 percent in 2004 were similar to those of Malaysia 9.1 and converging to 
the levels of Korea and other East Asian economies of around 6 percent. They were 
already far below the average non-agricultural rates applied by other major developing 
countries such as Brazil 12.7, Egypt 19.5, India 27.9 and Mexico 17.1. China’s average 
applied tariffs on agricultural products of 16.2 percent are similar to those of the 
Philippines and Chinese Taipei and far below those of Korea, Thailand, Egypt, India and 
Mexico.  
  China’s services liberalization is also very impressive. Commitments have been 
made for ninety three sectors, a number way above the typical developing country or 
ASEAN member and quite in line with the commitments of Korea (98 sectors) and South 
Africa (91 sectors.) Among noteworthy commitments: the banking sector is to be 
completely open to foreign competition by the end of 2006. In telecommunications up to 
49 percent ownership is to be allowed by 2006. The Insurance sector was also extensively 
liberalized.   Foreign securities houses were allowed minority equity and several 
professional services, most notably legal were liberalized as well.   11 
  WTO Participation. Appraisals of China’s performance at the WTO are generally 
positive.
8  Its delegation is regarded as being of high quality. It has participated actively 
in regular WTO activities. Remarkably, it has only been involved in one dispute as a 
complainant (US steel safeguards) and two as a defendant. There was a case initiated by 
the United States in March 2004 relating to preferential value added tax for domestically 
designed integrated circuits
9 and currently there is a case regarding auto parts in which 
both the US and the EU allege China has violated its commitments.  In several other 
cases where China has been challenged they have quickly come into compliance.
10 China 
has also participated in 47 cases as a third party something which both the EU and US 
                                                 
8 According to Pearson, “on a personal level, China’s interlocutors at the WTO, as at APEC, are uniformly 
complimentary about the quality of China’s delegation”.  
9 The case resulted in a mutually agreed solution in October 2005 China agreed to amend or revoke the 
measures at issue.  
10 Author’s private communication with a US trade lawyer based in China.   12 
routinely do to ensure that they have the right to defend their interests should the need 
arise. This participation is a clear demonstration that China views its interests as systemic 
and that these go beyond only those disputes in which it is directly involved. 
  China has also been active in the Doha Round negotiations. Non-Agricultural 
Market Access (NAMA) is the area of greatest importance as an offensive objective. 
China would like to as much liberalization as possible by other countries while at the 
same time insisting on special treatment for countries that have recently acceded. China 
has engaged actively in NAMA discussions of formulas that should be employed for 
tariff reduction. In agriculture its positions are more mixed. It is very interested in 
reducing subsidies and protection in developed countries. It chose to participate in the 
G20 formed at Cancun in order to press these claims although it has not been particularly 
active in joining other groups.  It would also like to see lower barriers to its agricultural 
exports to developing countries.  On the other hand, China also seeks some flexibility in 
commitments assumed by developing countries to assist poor farmers and promote rural 
development.  In the services area, China also has a particular interest in mode-four 
liberalization the movement of natural persons. This would increase opportunities for 
Chinese workers to work abroad . China is particularly concerned about rules. It seeks 
more disciplines on anti-dumping practices such as zeroing for example. China has also 
voiced its support for trade facilitation although it is not particularly interested in such 
assistance for itself. It has also not been a vociferous advocate of S&D treatment because   13 
it clearly has an important interest in seeing developing countries with large markets such 
as India and Brazil making meaningful liberalization commitments.
11  
  Overall, therefore, in the Round, China has not tried to take as a strong a 
leadership role as Brazil, but it has by no means been passive. This is also true of its 
activity at the WTO more generally.   Hakan Nordstrom has undertaken a very interesting 
analysis of country participation in WTO activities. He has collected data on all written 
submissions members have undertaken both individually and with others in 2003. These 
reflect activities undertaken both in the ruling bodies of the WTO as well as in the Doha 
Round negotiations.  China emerges in these data as the most active developing country 
and the third most active WTO member. Its total of 65 written submissions was 
considerably below those for the EU (120 submissions) and the USA (116), but greater 
India the second most active developing country participant. The detailed data reported in 
appendix Table1 indicate that China was especially active in the Rules Committee with 
18 submissions, ten of which related to subsidies and countervailing duties.  
Table 2. Top 10 WTO participants (written submissions, 2003) 
Rank  Member  Category  Overall  Individual  Joint 
1  EC  D  120  105  15 
2  USA  D  116  109  7 
3  China  DC  65  48  17 
4  Japan  D  61  44  17 
5  Australia  D  50  44  6 
6  India  DC  48  16  32 
7  Switzerland  D  46  23  23 
8  Chile  DC  45  16  29 
9  Thailand  DC  44  16  28 
10  Canada  D  43  36  7 
           
 
                                                 
11 Pearson makes the interest point that China has not been a participant in coalitions of developing 
countries that have resisted liberalization such as the “Like-minded Group” that focused on the difficulties 
of developing country implementation (page 23) 
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Source: Nordström 
12 
  In most respects, therefore, China appears as a constructive member working to 
pursue its interests which for the most part correspond to the organization’s goals of 
greater multilateral liberalization. There are however two matters in which China has 
been more aggressive and even recalcitrant. Both reflect powerful domestic political 
concerns. The first relates to Taiwan.  Members of the WTO are officially customs 
territories rather than sovereign nations. As such China could tolerate the accession of 
Taiwan which also occurred at Doha. At the same time, however, the government of 
China has fiercely fought any gesture by WTO members that could imply that Taiwan 
enjoyed sovereign status. This has led to testy interactions when Taiwan attempted to 
exercise its rights to formal consultations.  In 2003, there was also considerable friction in 
response to Chinese efforts to downgrade Taiwan status from “permanent mission” which 
could imply an independent country to office of permanent representative”
13 
  China has also been visibly unenthusiastic about the annual Transitional Review 
Mechanism it is forced to undergo. China is required by the terms of accession agreement 
each year to provide an extensive amount of data regarding its policies and performance 
and then to submit to questioning by other members.  These reviews are a nagging 
reminder about the terms of its accession that some in China viewed as having been a sell 
out. They also appear to question China’s integrity and its willingness to honor its legally 
binding commitments.  China grudgingly sticks to the letter of law in meeting this 
                                                 
12Håkan Nordström “ Participation of developing countries in the WTO - new evidence based on the 2003 
official records” National Board of Trade, Sweden (mimeo) 2005. 
 
 
13 Pearson op. cit. page 16.   15 
commitment, giving only oral answers to questions that are often less than forthcoming. 
It is clearly an unwilling participant and does not take kindly to the treatement.  
  All told therefore, China is seeking normalcy not special treatment and this is 
something it will gain once the transitory arrangements associated with its accession 
expire. Within a decade, special safeguards, non-market status, and transitional review 
mechanisms will expire and China will gladly assume its role as a more normal but very 
important WTO member. 
  What accounts for the way in which China has participated in the WTO? Why has 
it chosen to be constructive and yet not highly assertive? China is constructive because 
the WTO is a very attractive institution for China that clearly serves its interests. To be 
sure, China was important enough to receive MFN treatment from almost all countries 
even prior to joining, and some suggested that by joining under such demanding terms, it 
was opening itself up to challenges that could have actually reduced its market access. 
14But, for the most part such challenges have been conspicuous by their absence, and 
China now enjoys unconditional MFN treatment and the ability to enforce its rights 
through the dispute settlement system. 
  China’s political relations with other countries are often problematic because of 
the undemocratic nature of its system of government and its poor record on human rights. 
This gives China a great interest in a strong, rules-based WTO because it allows its trade 
and investment issues to be placed a less political, more technical track.  In addition, 
since China does not have FTAs or benefit from preferences in its major developed 
country markets -- the US, EU and Japan (so far) -- the MFN terms on which access to 
these markets is granted is especially important for China. 
                                                 
14 See Mallon and Whalley op. cit.   16 
  Bargaining at the WTO is done on the basis of reciprocal concessions. This means 
that those with the largest markets exercise the greatest power. China’s large and growing 
market and its willingness and ability to liberalize position it naturally to exercise 
influence. But so far, it has been prudent it the way it has exercised this power.  This is 
because China also seeks to be a leader of the developing countries and its economic 
interest in liberalization and competitiveness in exporting come into conflict with the 
desire of many developing countries to seek special and differential treatment and benefit 
from preferential access. This leads it to be less outspoken about its interests than it might 
otherwise be and allows China to leave the demands for developing country liberalization 
to the developed countries.  
   Historically, times during which new powers are arising on the global stage have 
been filled with tension. And the real challenge for the rest of the world lies in ensuring 
that an emergent China has incentives to engage the rest of the world in a cooperative and 
peaceful fashion. China’s performance at the WTO suggests that at least so far, by 
allowing China to join, the rest of the world has helped meet this challenge.      
          Section III: Regional  Arrangements.  
    Like almost every other WTO member, China has not confined its trade 
policy to the WTO. 
15 Instead, it has both embraced and stimulated the current global 
trend towards Free Trade Agreements.
16  China has concluded several agreements and 
is in the process of negotiating many more. In 2001, it began talks with ASEAN that 
                                                 
15 Some countries, embarrassed by the need to explain why they are departing from a pure multilateral 
strategy use the excuse of slow movement in the Doha Round as the reason why they are suddenly 
launching into a large number of FTAs but this is not generally very persuasive since some of the countries 
making this excuse are among the least forthcoming. This is not, however, an argument made by the 
Chinese government. 
16 For an excellent overview see Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley “China’s New Regional Trade 
Arrangements” NBER Working Paper  10992 December 2004.   17 
resulted in an agreement to eliminate tariffs and continue with a view to obtaining 
agreements with respect to investment and services. It 2003 an agreement in 
agriculture was concluded with Thailand. In 2004,  Hong Kong & Macau signed 
agreements with the Mainland. In 2005, an agreement with Chile was concluded and 
there are currently ongoing FTA negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Southern Africa Customs Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Other 
discussions that are ongoing include Brazil, Iceland, India, Japan and South Korea. In 
what follows, I first describe some of these agreements and then appraise their 
significance.  
  Asean. In 2002 a framework agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation was signed with ASEAN to serve as guide for achieving an FTA that 
covers goods services and investment.  The goal is to have an FTA in place by 2010 
among the more advanced of these countries. The newer ASEAN members (Vietnam, 
Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) will have until 2015 to comply.  An early harvest 
program reduced or eliminated tariffs in about 10 percent of lines by 2006. Most 
other tariffs are to be eliminated on between 2005 and 2010, by which time 90 
percent of tariff lines should be covered. The remaining 10 percent are deemed 
sensitive and will be removed at a slower pace. 
17There are also ongoing negotiations 
with respect to services and investment and expectations that ASEAN could obtain 
benefits from acceleration in China’s WTO service liberalization commitments.
1819  
                                                 
17 The sensitive groups of products would have their tariffs slashed starting in 2012 to reach a level between 
zero and 5 percent by 2020, while highly sensitive goods may maintain their import duties but only to a 
maximum 50 percent in 2020. 
 
18 Singapore government website. 
19 Investment Negotiations It has been agreed that the ASEAN Investment Agreement (AIA) would be used 
as a template for investment negotiations.    18 
  China has heralded this agreement. Its press observes 
 “The China-ASEAN FTA will form a huge market, with 1.85 billion consumers and a 
combined gross domestic product of almost US$2.5 trillion.  The value of imports and 
exports of this zone will hopefully exceed that of the NAFTA (North America Free Trade 
Agreement) by 2010 and its GDP will likely be higher than that in the European Union 
market. These three, China-ASEAN free trade zone, NAFTA and the EU, will become 
the three pillars of the world economy.”
20 
 
 China has also had talks on bilateral FTAs with some of the ASEAN countries. In 
particular it concluded the agreement with Thailand that focused on fruits and vegetables 
in 2003. It also started talks with Singapore but these were suspended over a fallout on 
Taiwan.   
  Hong Kong and Macao. The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
Agreement signed by China and Hong Kong was the first completed FTA agreement 
signed by both parties.  Its stated purpose is “to strengthen trade and investment 
cooperation by liberalizing tariff and non-tariff barriers on substantially all trade, 
liberalizing services and promoting trade and investment facilitation.” (CEPA Pre-
Amble)  
   The CEPA Agreement specifically makes clear that the parties will not apply the  
provisions of China’s WTO accession that allow countries to (a) subject China to non-
market economy status in the application of anti-dumping; and (b) impose special 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cooperation 
ASEAN and China have also agreed to cooperation focusing on 5 priority sectors namely: agriculture, ICT, 
HRD, investment and the Mekong River Basin development, and 11 other activities including the 
acceleration of the Singapore-Kunming Railway Project 
 
20 These were the remarks by Wang Jinzhen, spokesman of China Council of Promotion of International 
Trade (CCPIT), in Xiamen, Sept.7￿
Remarks by Wang Jinzhen, spokesman of China Council of Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), in 
Xiamen, Sept.7 
   19 
safeguards on all trade until 2012 and on textiles through 2008. 
21  The schedules of the 
Agreement provide for the Mainland to eliminate duties on all products of Hong Kong 
origin (except prohibited articles) provided that CEPA rules of origin are met. Both sides 
also eliminate the application of anti-dumping measures or countervailing measures 
although they can apply safeguards. Services are liberalized using a positive list approach 
and in accordance with WTP practice extends the preferential treatment to “service 
suppliers of other WTO members that are engaged in substantive business operations.” 
Financial cooperation is given a lot of attention. The Mainland supports state-owned 
banks in relocating their treasure and foreign exchange trading centers to Hong Kong, in 
making acquisitions, using Hong Kong financial intermediaries, cooperative financial 
regulation, and the listing of insurance companies in Hong Kong. “The liberalization 
permits earlier access for Hong Kong service suppliers to the Mainland market, ahead of 
China' s World Trade Organization (WTO) timetable. In some sectors, like audiovisual 
services, transport services and distribution services, the concessions go beyond China' s 
WTO commitments.”  
22There are specific provisions for cooperation in financial 
services (banking, securities and insurance) tourism, and trade and investment 
facilitation, and for encouraging the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and 
exchange of “professional talents”. “The two sides shall resolve any problem arising from 
the interpretation or implement of the “CEPA” through “consultation in the spirit of 
friendship and cooperation.” A Joint Steering Committee with officials designated by 
                                                 
21 These are contained in Articles 15 and 16 of the “Protocol on the Accession of  the People’s Republic of 
China to the WT0” and par 242 of the “Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China”  China  
22Trade and Industry Department of Hong Kong Web Site 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/details/note.html#goods   20 
both sides will make decisions by consensus. (Art 19:5) The Agreement signed with 
Macao follows a very similar template.  
  Since Hong Kong did not apply tariffs on Chinese goods, for China this 
agreement clearly was not about eliminating tariffs on its exports. It was given greater 
security from anti-dumping and countervailing actions. However there are additional 
advantages. First, it signaled the special status of Hong Kong, second it gains relief from 
the discriminatory treatment in the WTO agreement. Third, it clearly used the agreement 
to signal government support for mainland financial institutions in Hong Kong. In 
addition it provides services firms in Hong Kong first foreign mover advantages. 
Indirectly, it also provides advantages for Hong Kong over Taiwan.     
  Chile. In 2005 China and Chile concluded an FTA The two countries took less 
than a year to negotiate the accord, which immediately eliminates tariffs on 92% of 
Chile' s exports to China and 50% of the products that China sends to Chile. The pact does 
not cover services.
23 In 10 years after the start of the tariff concession process, the import 
tariff of 97% of the tariff lines of both sides will be zero. Furthermore, the Agreement 
provides that the two Parties may accelerate the tariff concession upon consensus through 
consultation 
  New Zealand hopes to become the first developed country to sign an FTA with 
China. It has already become the first developed economy to grant it market economy 
status.  The FTA talks have gone on for several years. The New Zealand government, 
                                                 
23 China-Chile FTA will start the comprehensive tariff concession in the latter half of 2006. At the Chilean 
side, the import tariff rates of 74% of the tariff lines will be lowered to zero immediately after the 
Agreement takes effect, while at the Chinese side, 63% of the import tariff lines will have zero rate within 2 
years; The remaining import tariff lines of both Parties, will be zero rated 5 to 10 years after the Agreement 
becomes effective. Each party may keep only 3% of the tariff lines as exceptions with tariff rates 
unchanged.  
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which was criticized for signing an agreement with Thailand that failed to include 
services, is insistent that the deal should be comprehensive and in addition to covering 
covers goods, services and investment, include provisions for rules of origin, trade 
remedies, intellectual property and government procurement. 
  Australia. China is also involved in FTA talks with Australia. Again the 
memorandum of understanding that launched the talks granted China market economy 
status. The Australian Government has also made clear that it is seeking a comprehensive 
agreement that applies to “substantially” all goods, trade in services “as well as other 
non-tariff issues such as the recognition of standards, customs cooperation, protection of 
intellectual property rights and regulation of foreign investment.”  
24 
25 Australia is a 
highly competitive producer of agricultural and mineral products. In 2005, it accounted 
for 98 percent of all Chinese beef imports, 12 percent of dairy imports, and significant 
amounts of cotton and wool.  There are significant exports of barely, wheat, hides and 
skins and wine and very substantial quantities of iron ore, uranium, non-ferrous metals. 
Given Chinese tariffs on agricultural products of 15.3 percent and on Australian 
manufactured goods of up to 45 percent, the amount of liberalization for China could be 
substantial.
26 On Australia’s part, the quid pro quo would be liberalization of tariffs on 
                                                 
24 Australia-China Free Trade Agreement, Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, March 2006. 
25 The Government also stresses “we will not be rushed. The Australian Government has stressed that any 
FTA with China must deliver real gains for Australian businesses across the board. That is, it must be 
comprehensive – covering goods, services and investment –and be completed as a single undertaking.” 
Ibid.  
 
26 In a model done for the Australian government the authors assume Chinese barriers in 
agriculture have the following tariff equivalents: Wool 15 percent, Sugar 25 percent, OilSeeds 13 
percent, Cereals 3 percent, Wheat 30 percent, processed rice 10.6 percent. Source: Philip ADAMS 
Mingtai FAN Ronglin LI and  Zhaoyang ZHENG An Independent Report Prepared for: The 
Australia-China FTA Feasibility Study The Centre of Policy Studies Monash University 2 March 
2005 
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labor intensive manufactured goods. In the textiles and clothing sector, Australian 
average tariffs are 9.1 percent and there are 234 tariff lines with rates of between 16 and 
20 percent, and 387 between 6 and 10 percent; in footwear there are 4 lines between 16 
and 20 percent and average rate of protection of 5.6 percent. 
27 
   The fact that China is willing to conclude FTAs with these two developed 
countries that are highly competitive agricultural producers is very significant since it 
indicates a willingness to contemplate major adjustments in agriculture while also 
indicating these countries willingness to contemplate free trade in labor-intensive 
manufacturing.   
  Others. China has also launched talks with India and Pakistan.  New Delhi does 
not quite share the enthusiasm for a conventional FTA although it is willing to talk 
about cooperation. But Pakistan and China have signed a framework agreement, 
implemented an early harvest and Pakistan has provided China with the requisite 
market economy status. China is also discussing FTAs with many other potential 
partners in Latin America (Brazil, Peru), South Africa, the Gulf (GCC), Iceland,  Asia 
(Korea) and with regional groupings such as APEC and East Asia (Asean plus three),  
Implications.   
   China has numerous goals in signing these agreements. One immediate concern 
is to use them to obtain market status recognition and relief from being subject to  
special safeguards. -- Ironically China is using these discriminatory agreements as a 
way to remove the discrimination to which it has been subjected at the WTO. A 
second motive is to secure access to important raw materials— many of the countries 
                                                 
27source:  http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/feasibility_3.pdf   23 
are major suppliers of minerals (Chile-copper, Australia -- iron-ore and uranium, and 
GCC—oil). A third is to solidify its relations and influence both inside and beyond 
the East Asian region and a fourth, the most basic, is to gain improved market access 
for its exports which as labor –intensive manufactured and agricultural goods are 
often subject to high tariff protection. Individual agreements are also used to achieve 
specific goals. For example, the Hong Kong and Macao agreements help underscore 
the privileged relationship between the Mainland and these economies and ensure that 
despite their differences measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
could not be used to segment them. In addition these agreements were used to 
implement specific joint initiatives and signal clearly that Beijing would permit 
increased state owned banks to move some of their operations to Hong Kong.    
  China is well aware of concerns that it is trying to dominate East Asia and/or 
close it to outsiders, and it has gone to great pains to allay such fears. It is particularly 
reluctant to appear domineering in its interactions with Asean and it prefers that 
ASEAN take the leading role in the bilateral relationship.  China also does not want 
to be seen as building a fortress Asia. Consider this official statement: 
 
 “We should continue to support ASEAN in playing the leading role in East Asia 
cooperation. On the other hand, we should give due consideration to the legitimate 
interests of the non-East Asian countries in this region, so as to gain their 
understanding of and support for East Asia cooperation.”
28 
 
  In general, China’s approach to FTAs has been very pragmatic. It has shown a 
willingness to negotiate with countries individually and in groups (e.g. Asean and 
                                                 
28 “Be Open and Inclusive And Achieve Mutual Benefit and Common Progress” Statement by   
Premier Wen Jiabao  at The First East Asia Summit  Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 14 December 
2005http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wjbfw/t228275.htm 
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Asean+Korea+Japan) with developed (new Zealand and Australia) and developing 
countries and with those that are heavily specialized in agriculture (New Zealand and 
Australia), manufactured goods (Asean, South Korea) and services (Hong Kong).  It 
has been focused on East Asia but also quite willing to deal with countries in Latin 
America, South Asia, and Africa. It has sought to signal that its interests are global. 
   The agreements have not followed a single template. Some have included 
goods, services, investment and cooperation (e.g. Hong Kong, Macao), others cover 
only goods (e.g. Chile), while some have started with goods liberalization with the 
intention to add services and investment later. (e.g.  Asean).  Several have been 
launched with an early harvest in which some liberalization has come into effect as 
soon as talks have commenced.  The deepest agreements thus far are with Hong Kong 
and Macao, although even these do not cover issues that are part and parcel of 
agreements that are typically signed by the US (e.g. intellectual property, labor and 
environment, government procurement, dispute settlement by panels) or the EU (e.g. 
competition policy).    
  Stumbling blocs?  These Chinese initiatives raise several concerns that are 
traditionally mentioned in debates about regional trade arrangements. The first is the 
concern that these regional arrangements are likely to undermine the multilateral trading 
system. This fear is misplaced.  If (and this is an important qualification) they do achieve 
liberalization in “substantially all trade” FTA agreements that involve China are likely to 
hasten global liberalization. China has not insisted on covering services and investment 
in its agreements, but its agreements do include liberalization in most merchandise 
products Since China is such a competitive supplier of labor intensive manufactures, for   25 
most countries, an FTA signed with China is very likely to be trade-creating on the 
import side. Indeed, any country that adjusts domestically to Chinese competition is most 
likely to require little additional adjustment before it opens up to developing countries as 
a whole. (The same would be true of countries opening up in services mode four –the 
movement of natural persons if this is included in agreements.)  If China is able to sign  
FTAs with the Asian Pacific region, this region will be readily positioned to extend this 
liberalization to the rest of world.   
  A similar argument holds for those signing FTAs with the US with respect to 
services and investment. The US has insisted on deep agreements that cover services with 
a negative list and investment in addition to trade in goods including agriculture. Any 
country that signs with both China and the US could surely extend these benefits to the 
rest of the world without major additional dislocation. 
   The dominoes appear to falling. Each time China concludes an FTA with another 
significant trading partner, it puts pressure on others to preserve their access to the 
world’s most rapidly growing market. In numerous sectors, China’s MFN tariffs remain 
significant and thus FTAs could give producers of those products a significant 
competitive advantage.  Likewise, each time China succeeds in obtaining preferential 
access to another market it adds to the pressure for others who sell in that market to 
obtain similar access.  Korea and Japan for example, reacted to the agreement between 
China and Asean by proposing FTAs of their own with Asean – something they probably 
would not have done before.
29  
                                                 
29 The Korea International Trade Association (KITA) said the China-ASEAN FTA, which will come into 
force Wednesday, is expected to create the world’s largest economic bloc, with bilateral trade amounting to 
US$1.2 trillion.   26 
  The FTA between Korea and ASEAN is still being finalized. It is expected to be 
implemented this year and remove duties on 80 per cent of goods traded by 2009. Korea 
and ASEAN have also pledged to conclude negotiations on liberalization in services and 
investment by the end of this year. Korea also has FTAs with Chile and Singapore and is 
seeking similar deals with several Latin American and other countries.  
  Currently, Japan is reported to be in the process of developing a concerted 
response to the pressures it is feeling from the Chinese and US initiatives. It is developing 
new policies with respect to agriculture and the movement of labor and planning a host of 
additional agreements to preserve its competitive position. 
30 It appears that powerful 
forces of competitive liberalization are operating effectively. 
  Fortress Asia?  A second, related concern is that East Asia could become a 
“fortress” in which barriers are raised or at least not lowered with respect to the rest of 
the world. China is, however, clearly willing to negotiate with countries outside the 
region. Indeed this is true of the rest of Asia as well. The countries in the Asia Pacific are 
global traders and there is no evidence that they are confining their FTAs to the region. 
Instead, they are actively scouring the globe to find FTA partners.  Singapore has FTAs 
with the US and a host of countries outside the region. 
31Likewise Thailand, Malaysia and 
                                                                                                                                                 
The pact will cause disadvantages such as high tariffs for South Korean industries such as petrochemicals, 
textiles, shoes and electrical and electronic products, the KITA said. 
More than 21 per cent of South Korean exports to China will be subject to tariffs over 10 percentage points 
higher than those for China-bound ASEAN shipments in 2010, when the FTA is fully implemented, the 
KITA said. The FTA will impose no duties on more than 90 per cent of the trade between China and 
ASEAN members by that time. 
 
30 Japan has reached Agreements for Economic Partnership Arrangements with Philippines, Malaysia and 
Thailand. It is negotiating with Korea, Asean, Indonesia, and engaged in collaborative research with Chile, 
India, Australia, Switzerland. And in talks in Asean plus 3.  
31 Singapore’s government webpage lists eleven FTAs that are in place and fifteen more under negotiation. 
http://app.fta.gov.sg/asp/index.asp   27 
South Korea are all negotiating with the United States 
32and Japan has an FTA with 
Mexico. 
   Hub and spoke? A third concern is that China is going to erect a hub and spoke 
system in which China has access to the regional economy duty free, but the other 
countries do not have similar access to one another. But in fact, almost all countries in the 
region are now negotiating with each other. For example, Asean is negotiating with both 
South Korea and Japan and Australia with many countries in the region. So this fear is 
also misplaced.  
  Noodle bowl?  The one concern that is legitimate is the fact that these FTAs are 
creating a system of overlapping agreements with respect to rules of origin and other 
provisions that are unnecessarily cumbersome. By proceeding piecemeal in these 
negotiations, there is the danger for China and its other trading partners, that trade could 
be enveloped in the proverbial noodle bowl of agreements. Producers could have to meet 
different standards and rules of origin when selling to different partners.   This is an area 
in which the WTO and APEC have both seriously failed.  In particular Article XXIV 5(b) 
of the GATT only states that the “duties and other regulations of commerce” once the 
FTA is concluded shall not be higher or more restrictive than they were before. But it 
does little to discipline the crafting of these to meet specific circumstances in a manner 
that is protectionist and inefficient.  The simplest solution would be a single system of 
rules that would be applied by all WTO members in all preferential agreements.  
 
Section III. Qualifications. 
                                                 
32 Thailand' s negotiations with the US have confronted problems with respect to light trucks as well as 
agriculture and have become a domestic political issue.  
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  I have argued that thus far, China has promoted trade liberalization in both the 
WTO and through its FTAs. However, it should be stressed that many of the FTAs have 
yet to be completed and thus China’s trade and domestic policies remain very much a 
work in progress.  In this final section, therefore I make four major qualifications to this 
conclusion.  
  Agreement details. First, the history of free trade agreements is a very mixed one 
and in thinking about their implications it is important to pay attention both to their 
content and their prospects for implementation. Countries enter into FTAs with very 
different motives. Some are genuinely interested in promoting trade liberalization and 
deep economic integration and view the agreements as a complement to multilateral 
liberalization. For the most part, for example, the United States is using FTAs as part of 
such an offensive strategy.
33A second group of typically smaller countries is driven by 
the desire to improve their competitiveness as a location for production. It is often said 
that preferential trade arrangements are “second best” and that multilateral liberalization 
is first best. But for individual countries even better than free trade could be the 
combination of no barriers at home and preferential access to all foreign markets. This 
competitiveness motive seems to explain why Chile and Singapore have pursued these 
agreements so avidly. A third group of countries, however, are as yet unwilling to 
liberalize fully and are basically driven by defensive considerations to undertake these 
agreements. For these countries, there is often a temptation to conclude agreements that 
go by the name of FTAs but (a) take a long time to implement; (b) exclude significant 
amounts of potential trade in goods and services  (c) have highly restrictive rules of 
                                                 
33 To be sure there is resistance in the US particularly from sugar and clothing producers.   29 
origin that limit their impacts and (d) fail top include adequate provisions for 
enforcement.  
   China basically seeks to use FTAs fundamentally to secure market access i.e. for 
offensive purposes and it is prepared to open its market at home to do this. But its 
initiatives are also being driven by political considerations and the desire to reassure 
other countries. Unlike the US or the EU, China does not seem to have developed a 
demanding comprehensive FTA template that is used with minor changes with all its 
FTA partners.  Instead China has proceeded more opportunistically, signing agreements 
with quite different degrees of depth and coverage.  In part this is because China is using 
FTAs as much as an instrument of foreign policy as an instrument of trade policy.
34 This 
means that where China’s partner is willing to contemplate full liberalization in the 
context of a deep integration agreement, the result could be trade creation on a large 
scale. Indeed that would appear to be the implication of the types of agreements being 
aimed at by the Australian and New Zealand governments.  In negotiations with countries 
that fall into the defensive category, however, some of the agreements that are actually 
concluded could be quite limited and there may be less there than meets the eye.  
  Chinese implementation. A second key issue relates to the institutional capacity to 
ensure that the agreements China signs are actually implemented at home. This holds 
with respect both to China’s WTO and FTA commitments. The United States Trade 
Representative for example publishes an annual report on Chinese WTO compliance and 
it is filled with complaints of compliance failures. The most recent report for example is 
                                                 
34 The greater flexibility in these agreements may reflect domestic decision-making differences. In the case 
of the US, agreements must get through the congress.   30 
101 pages long. 
35  It is particularly concerned with the still incomplete transition from a 
state-planned economy.  Other concerns include: the lack of enforcement of intellectual 
property laws, the continued use of industrial policies in sectors such as auto-parts, steel, 
and high-tech, regulatory intervention to support domestic enterprises, export restrictions 
on coke, the use of standards to favor domestic high tech producers and sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary standards to favor domestic farmers. Nonetheless, the USTR report does 
acknowledge that China has made great strides towards coming into compliance and it is 
surely the case that trade agreements make it more likely that these issues can be 
resolved.      
  Loss of competitiveness. A third key qualification relates to the continuation of 
China’s competitiveness and its impact on Chinese domestic politics.  It seems clear that 
the competitiveness of its traded goods sector has clearly facilitated China’s adjustment 
to its WTO accession and contributed significantly to the character of the trade policy 
that I have described in this paper. China is basically eager to erect a legal and political 
superstructure to ensure its access to key inputs and markets and it is prepared to expose 
its domestic firms and farmers to increased foreign competition in order to do so. 
Nonetheless, even with the success it has enjoyed in recent years, domestic tensions have 
arisen with respect to the dislocation caused by the spread of the market economy.  
  There is a widespread view that the Chinese currency is seriously undervalued 
and there are strong external political pressures for a substantial appreciation. 
36 The 
                                                 
35 United States Trade Representative, 2005 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.GPO  
Washington DC: 2005. 
36 See “Clash of Titans” by C. Fred Bergsten.  Newsweek, International Edition April 24 2006.  Morris 
Goldstein,  “Reminbi Controversies” Paper prepared for the Conference on Monetary Institutions and 
Economic Development Cato Institute November 3, 2005  and Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, 
“What kind of Landing for the Chinese Economy? Policy Briefs in International Economics Number 
PB04.7 Institute for International economics November 2004.   31 
verdict of overvaluation seems supported by China’s very large current account surplus 
of about 5 percent of GDP in 2005 and its significant accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves over the past few years.  In March 2006, these amounted to $853.7 billion 
surpassing the reserves held by Japan and making Chinese holdings the world’s largest.  
There is considerable debate over the appropriate course of action to deal with this issue, 
and a discussion here is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for out purposes it 
should be recognized that if a significant appreciation of the reminbi was to undermine 
Chinese competitiveness, the broad thrust of the policies described here could be 
adversely affected. Domestic protectionist pressures would surely increase and China 
would be considerably less eager to pursue reciprocal free trade agreements if it was less 
confident in its ability to compete. Whatever the costs of China’s exchange rate policies 
might have been, therefore, the liberal nature of its recent trade policies should be 
counted among its benefits.    
  Hyper-competivenss. On the other hand, there could be problems abroad, if China 
becomes too competitive and protectionism abroad could offset Chinese liberalization at 
home. It could also undermine the application of MFN treatment.   In both the United 
States and the European Union for example, the very large bilateral trade deficits with 
China have heightened trade frictions.  The surge in Chinese clothing exports in 2005 
when the Multi-fiber Agreement expired, led to the use of special safeguards in both 
economies. While these were legal, they are certainly discriminatory.  
   In many developing countries, the highest non-agricultural tariffs are placed on 
precisely the labor-intensive products in which China specializes. So while China’s trade 
policies are a force for a more liberal trading order, China’s trade performance exerts 
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countervailing pressures in other countries. Some may rise to the challenge, but others 
could become even more reticent to embrace global engagement. 
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Table  A1: Distribution of submissions over areas and issues (2003)    China         WTO
Series  WTO body  DDA  Ind.  Joint  Total     Individual
      48  17  65    
   Ruling Bodies                   
WT/MIN 
(03)/     Ministerial Conference, Doha  X  1  4  5    
WT/GC/     General Council    1  5  6    
TN/C/     Trade Negotiations Committee  X  1  1  2    
   Agriculture                   
G/AG/     Committee on Agriculture      2  2    
TN/AG/     Committee on Agriculture - Special Session  X  1    1    
G/SPS/     Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures     3     3    
   Non-Agriculture Market Access (NAMA)                   
G/C/     Council for Trade in Goods (except trade facilitation)    1    1    
TN/MA/     Negotiating Group on Market Access  X  1    1    
G/MA/     Committee on Market Access    1    1    
G/RO/     Committee  on Rules of Origin            
G/VAL/     Committee  on Customs Valuation    1    1    
G/LIC/     Committee  on Import Licensing    1    1    
G/IT/     Committee  of Participation on the Expansion of Trade in IT prod.          
G/TBT/     Committee  on Technical Barriers to Trade    3    3    
G/TRIMS/     Committee  on Trade-Related Investment Measures    1    1    
G/STR/     Working Party on State Trading Enterprises                
   Rules                   
TN/RL/     Negotiating Group on Rules  X  4  2  6    
G/ADP/     Committee  on Anti-Dumping Practices             
G/ADP/AHG/     Committee  on anti-Dumping Practices – WG on Implementation          
G/SCM/     Committee  on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures    10    10    
G/SG/     Committee  on Safeguards    2    2    
WT/REG/     Committee  on Regional Trade Agreements                
   GATS                   
S/C/     Council for Trade in Services     2    2    
TN/S/     Council for Trade in Services – Special Session  X  1  3  4    
S/CSC/     Committee  on Specific Commitments            
S/FIN/     Committee  on Trade in Financial Services             
S/WPDR/     Working Party on Domestic Regulation             
S/WPGR/     Working Party on GATS Rules                
   TRIPS                   
IP/     Council for TRIPS    3    3    
TN/IP/     Council for TRIPS - Special Session  X             
   Singapore Issues                   
WT/WGTI/     WG on Relationship between Trade and Investment  X  2    2    
WT/WGTGP/     WG on Transparency in Government Procurement  X          
WT/WGTCP/     WG on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy  X  2    2    
G/C/     Trade facilitation (dedicated meetings of the General Council)  X             
   Development                     34 
WT/COMTD/     Committee  on Trade and Development              
TN/CTD/     Committee on Trade and Development - Special Session  X          
WT/BOP/     Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions            
WT/WGTTT/     Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology            
WT/TDF/     Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance                
   Trade and environment                   
WT/CTE/     Committee on Trade and Environment            
TN/TE/     Committee on Trade and Environment - Special Sessions  X  2     2    
TN/DS/  DSU Review     4     4    
Source: Nordstrom.   35 
 
 